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THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
STILL PROTECT THE RIGHT TO DO BUSI-
NESS IN CUTTING PRICES OR
SELLING BELOW COST
Rugged individualism in business recently received a se-
vere shock in a dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court.
The opinion was given unusual publicity and struck such a
harmonious note in certain high places of business manage-
ment, that we will not hear the end of it, unless the price
to pay for printer's ink gets into other hands.
Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in the recent
case, New State Ice Company v. Liebmann,' wherein the
Supreme Court rebuked the State of Oklahoma for attempt-
ing to limit by statute the number of persons who may en-
gage in the manufacture and sale of ice, said:
"The people of the United States are now confronted with an emer-
gency more serious than war. Misery is widespread, in a time not of
scarcity but of over-abundance. The long-continued depression has
brought unprecedented unemployment, a catastrophic fall in com-
modity prices .... Some people believe that the existing conditions
threaten even the stability of our capitalistic system."
Mr. Justice Brandeis said we should experiment with
such statutes in times like these. He appears to confess
that our present economic system has broken down and
the time has come to try a new system, even if it be uncon-
stitutional. In times of war, all business becomes subordi-
nate to the main purpose of winning the war. He sees a
worse condition in present times.
In colors of black despair, Justice Brandeis, who with
President Wilson, championed the small business men of
our country in 1912, paints a picture with the brush and
paint of those who see in monopolies, licensed agreements
1 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932).
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to regulate production and prices and forced co-operative
business, some kind of a new system better than that of
our revolutionary fathers. He justifies his opinion by refer-
ence to editorials in trade association journals, speeches by
presidents of large corporations against the competitive sys-
tem, plans of national and international bankers to eliminate
competitive production and articles such as the "Menace
of Overproduction," and "The Vices of Free Competition."
These and many others of the same kind of organized busi-
ness propaganda found a place for the first time in judicial
history in even a dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court.
Upon such reasoning, Justices Brandeis and Stone found
ground to disagree with the lower court's decision which
was affirmed by Justice Sutherland's opinion, speaking for
the majority, and which held that restricting the business
of the manufacture and sale of ice was void, unconstitution-
al and not justified under the guise of protecting the public
interest, even in times of depression. The fact that the cur-
tailment of production and limitation of competition, re-
sulting from the law, advanced the price of ice, did not
alone sway the court. "The principle," said Justice Suther-
land, "is embedded in our constitutional system that there
are certain essentials of liberty with which the state is not
entitled to dispense in the interest of experiments." I
The court found the scheme one to promote and foster
monopolies and to discourage competition. "Plainly," con-
tinued the court, "a regulation which has the effect of deny-
ing or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage
in a lawful private business . . . cannot be upheld as con-
sistent with the 14th amendment." The court concluded
that there was no difference in principle between Okla-
homa's unconstitutional law attempting to prevent compe-
tition in the ice business and "to prevent a shoemaker from
2 Citing Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1923) and other cases.
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making or selling shoes because shoemakers already in that
occupation can make and sell all the shoes that are needed."
The sorry plight of our Government Farm Board with
its millions of dollars of wheat and cotton bought in an
artificial non-competing market, resulting in enormous losses
of taxpayers' money on account of sympathy for one class
of our citizens, the farmer, should be an example sufficient
to stay the hand of Congress from making laws violative of
the Constitution on the ground of sympathy for the few.
It seems harsh to put law above sympathy, but it is logical
and wise to do so. Salus populi est suprema lex-The wel-
fare of the whole people is the supreme law.
The propaganda of those who seek to eliminate compe-
tition and to overthrow the fundamentals of our competi-
tive system which is founded upon the greatest amount of
freedom possible in the right to do business, has been so
persistent that not only Supreme Court judges but govern-
mental departments as well are declaring that it is against
the law for one to buy and sell personal property on terms
agreeable to himself. Selling below cost or price-cutting
is dubbed a vicious practice and one that should be pre-
vented by law. In the light of the demand for laws to fur-
ther nullify our Anti-Trust Laws and laws which are aimed
to keep the channels of interstate and intrastate commerce
wide open to individual enterprise, it might be interesting
to re-examine several of the fundamental principles of
justice protecting our competitive system.
When we understand the rules and reasons underlying
the constitutional principles requiring a competitive system
in trading, we find no difficulty in rising to defend the as-
sault on the fundamentals that have so effectively woven
the fabric of our magnificent structure of government. It
is plainly organized interference with these constitutional
principles that caused the depression and its continuation,
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rather than the permitting of the natural laws of supply
and demand to have full and free opportunity to level sup-
plies and prices to the pocketbooks of buyers.
The following is an endeavor to outline briefly the de-
velopment of the right to buy and sell personal property
whether the right be coupled with a public or a private in-
terest, and to definitely establish the point that it is not
against the law to cut prices, sell below cost or to dispose
of personal property in a manner agreeable to the owner,
just so long as that right does not interfere with the right
of others or where the paramount interest of the public is
not involved.
Sir Matthew Hale, in 1670, so excellently outlined man's
rights in personal property and the times when his rights
are subordinate to the public interest, that his statement
of the law was approved as recently as 1927 in Tyson &
Bros. v. Banton.' But centuries before Lord Hale wrote
his remarkable discussion, the King, localities, and finally,
Parliament, regulated the resale prices of many commodities
and fixed their place of manufacture when the public interest
was at stake. Parliament established the crimes of fore-
stalling, forebarring, regrating and engrossing, which were
all aimed to prevent the seller from charging exorbitantly
for his wares.4
At the time of the American Revolution, at least eight
of the thirteen colonies had price-fixing statutes governing
almost every commodity in the market.5 Mr. Breck P. Mc-
Allister says that the removal of the restriction on the right
to fix the price upon your own property and get what you
can (when it was not coupled with a public interest) was
due to the writings of Adam Smith, who first led owners of
3 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
4 Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HAiz. L. REv. 135;
MONOPOLIES, 41 C. J. 84.
5 See 33 HAR. L. Rav. 838, 839, footnotes, for a list.
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property to demand a change and to think that way. But
nowadays, under our Constitution, one does not devote his
property or business to the public merely because one en-
gaged in common callings makes commodities for, and sells
to the public.6
Justice Taft in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations,7 discussing the question of price regulation in the
public interest, divided regulations into three classes: (1)
Public grants of privileges; (2) certain exceptional occupa-
tions; and (3) those kinds of businesses impressed by their
nature with a public interest. "But never," he said, "has
the regulation of food preparation been extended to fixing
wages or the prices to the public." 8
When your personal property is burdened with a public
interest in such a manner as to justify the state in fixing
what it believes to be the fair price for you to ask, the
price is not determined by a definite standard of competi-
tion and is not viewed and examined in such a way as to
maintain the competitive system guaranteed under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Monopoly grants and
public convenience play the principal part in arriving at the
price or rate. Even a state may not brand a business as
being coupled with the public interest if, in fact, it is not,
as was so recently decided in New State Ice Company v.
Liebmann,9 which re-stated the law found in the theatre
ticket case of Tyson v. Banton "0 as follows:
"The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself." 11
6 Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public In-
terest (1930) 43 HAR. L. REV. 759.
7 262 U. S. 522 (1922).
8 Op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 538.
9 Op. cit. supra note 1.
10 Op. cit. supra note 3.
11 Op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 429, citing State Freight Tax, 15 Wall.
232, 278 (1872).
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Such a right is within the protection of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
There is a deep-seated public interest for the preservation
of society, as we know it today, to see to it, that every man
carrying on a business, whether it be little or big, shall be
free from public and private interference. The following
has been the correct view of the law for several hundred
years, among English-speaking countries:
"All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all
restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are con-
trary to public policy, and therefore void." 12
It has been the purpose of Society for many generations
to permit the owner to give away or sell freely, his whole
interest in personalty, and to fully protect him in that right,
with the same force as it gives a man the right to buy at
a price agreeable to him alone.
To circumvent or to destroy this common law, and in-
alienable rights, has been the profitable pastime of many
schemers, inside and outside of the legal profession. The
tempting bait held out to the gullible merchant by most
trade association organizers, is some artful plan, which they
claim will enable them to outwit the courts and prohibit
the exercise of the full right to sell that which is the owner's,
upon his own terms, whether they be sensible or whimsical.
Our English sovereign was accustomed to recite in the pre-
amble of royal grants of monopolies, that the aim was to
reduce prices, effect economies in the public interest, and
this is even now a common defense used by most of the law
violators when caught. But our Supreme Court has con-
tinuously and consistently brushed aside such defenses as
inconsistent with our laws of trade."3
12 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 406
(1910).
13 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1910); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1910).
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The deadly enemies of groups who work openly or under
cover upon price maintenance agreements, are the men who
refuse to make the sacrifice of their individuality and who,
at times, not only cut the agreed price of an organized
group, but who actually sell their own personal property
upon terms agreeable to themselves, and who do, at times,
without concerted action or consent of others, positively sell
at a price below the cost, or go so far as to give their goods
away.
This "price-cutter" type of tradesman has been cursed
and damned in at least a thousand trade association meet-
ings in a thousand different ways. There appears to be no
limit to the ability of human inventiveness to create devices
to whip the alleged rascal "price-cutter" into line. Make
him suffer somehow or completely destroy him as a business
rival, whether by foul means, which are described in num-
erous United States and State cases, some of which are
mentioned later, or by propaganda and public agitation for
laws to break down the right to sell at prices agreeable to
the owner.
Sales of personal property below cost are not unlawful,
unjust, dishonest or inequitable practices and can never be
made so without nullifying the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The importance of this
fundamental right to keep such a power of alienation free
from interference is axiomatic. Selling below cost or giving
away "free goods, ' all with and for the deliberate and de-
clared purpose of putting a man's competitor right out of
business, is not, at the present time, against any Constitu-
tional, State or Federal law, nor is such a practice unfair
competition, nor an unfair method of competition, as defined
by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Act, which is designed
to make unlawful all unfair methods of competition in in-
terstate commerce.
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The justness of the proposition is at once clear. Further-
more, the intention to put a man's business rival out of busi-
ness, by sales below cost or cutting below the other fellow's
price, is not material. The exercise of a lawful right with
wicked intentions is never a violation of another man's
right.14
Therefore, the question of making a price in "good faith,"
to meet competition where nothing more appears, is not the
test to find a violation of law.
The foundation of the fundamental right to sell what you
own, whether it be services or commodities, at a price agree-
able to yourself, find the light of day at a time in English
history, when men other than Kings, could claim ownership
in property and serfdom was abolished. Much might be
developed, showing the growth of the ancient right to alien-
ate personal property and to fix the price of your own day's
work, but adjudicated cases in law courts can be found pro-
tecting this right beginning with the School Masters case
as early as 1410.1' In this case, 6 the plaintiffs were the
only school teachers in a town. The defendant started a
competing school and cut the price for teaching. The plain-
tiffs' writ of trespass was dismissed, the court holding the
price the defendant had fixed was fair and that there was
no ground to maintain the action. The court said that com-
petition under the circumstances was "an ease to the people."
"In Commonwealth v. Hunt, Chief Justice Shaw imagines
this case: Suppose a new baker sets up against an old baker.
Prices are reduced; the old baker is damaged; he therefore
sues. The Chief Justice says: No legal wrong is done; the
same thing may be said of all competition in every branch
of trade and industry; and yet it is through that competition
14 Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 Fed. 696 (1902).
15 Y. B. 11 Hen. IV. 47
16 This case is discussed by Bruce Wyman in Competition and the Law,
15 HAR. L. REV. (1902) 427, 428, 429.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that the best interests of trade and industry are promoted;
of this competition there are a thousand modem in-
stances." 17
Note this oft-cited piano case, Ajello v. Worsley.'8 Ajello
made pianos and sold them to Worsley, a dealer in furniture,
whose policy was to sell pianos below cost, in order to in-
duce the sale of furniture, which frequently happened.
Ajello sued Worsley for damages, but the court dismissed
the suit, holding no cause, saying that Worsley's act was
lawful regardless of the loss to Ajello.'9
The Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey 20 case explains
that bad motive, i. e., wilful desire and successful achieve-
ment in putting a competitor out of business by sales below
cost, is not in itself such a tort that may be enjoined because
the act lawful in itself cannot be converted by a malicious
or bad motive into an unlawful method of competition. An
old case, Jenkins v. Fowler,2 says:
"As long as a man keeps himself within the law by doing no act which
violates it, we must leave his motive to Him who search the heart." 22
There appears at first sight, a variety of adverse opinions
to the above citations and statements, but the adverseness
vanishes when the philosophy of the right to do business is
carefully examined.
The paramount interest of the public sometimes forces
the individual to subordinate his rights, such as in cases
involving the police and taxing powers. Other exceptions
are found when the nature of business is coupled with a
public interest. But as steadfastly as did the courts in an-
17 Bruce Wyman, op. cit. supra note 16, at p. 430.
18 [1898] 1 Ch. 274.
19 See also Passaic Print Work v. Ely & Walker Dry-Goods Co., 105 Fed.
163 (1900).
20 Op. cit. supra note 14.
21 24 Pa. St. 308, 310 (1855).
22 See also 2 CooLEY ON ToRTs, 3rd ed., p. 1505; Federal Trade Commission
v. Raymond Bro.-Clark Co., 263 U. S. 565 (1923).
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cient times, our Supreme Court will brook no interference
with a business, whether by the nation or state.
In Adams v. Tanner 23 we have an excellent statement of
the point:
"You take my house when you do take the prop that doth sustain my
house; you take my life when you do take the means whereby I live.24
* * *
"Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection
with this business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by proper
regulations. But this is not enough to justify destruction of one's
right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright way. Certainly
there is no profession, possibly no business, which does not offer pecu-
liar opportunities for reprehensible practices; and as to every one of
them, no doubt, some can be found quite ready earnestly to maintain
that its suppression would be in the public interest. Skillfully directed
agitation might also bring about apparent condemnation of any one of
them by the public. Happily for all, the fundamental guaranties of
the Constitution cannot be freely submerged if and whenever some
ostensible justification is advanced and the police power invoked." 25
A few cases that are often cited as authorities for the
statement that it positively is against the law to sell below
cost, might be examined with interest. Instead of these cases
disproving the statement, they illustrate the truth of the
first proposition, by proving that the sale below cost was not
the thing that was condemned in the cases, but a group of
acts aimed directly at a violation of one of the first prin-
ciples of justice defining the limitations upon man's exer-
cise of a legal right over that which is his.
"Every man is free to do that which. he wills,
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any
other man."--Spencer.
"Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." The breach of
man's duty or obligation to society is defined in primitive
law, later developed in ancient common law and finds ex-
23 244 U. S. 590 (1916).
24 Op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 593.
25 Op. cit. supra note 23, at pp. 594, 595.
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pression in this maxim. When it is written into statutes, it
always contemplates the greatest amount of freedom of use
of one's own property.
"This is a measuring of justice with liberty," said Mr.
Justice Cardozo, in his brilliant discussion of "The Para-
doxes of Legal Science."
Let us look at the frequently-cited barber shop case of
Tuttle v. Buck,2" quoted as authority for the proposition
that a man may not sell below cost. Tuttle owned a pros-
perous barber shop. Buck, a banker, fitted up an opposi-
tion shop, hired two barbers, gave them free rent, so that
they could cut prices. Buck threatened to ruin Tuttle and
destroy his business by circulating false reports among
Tuttle's customers in order to induce them to no longer go
to Tuttle's shop, but to go to his (Buck's) shop. The fol-
lowing quotation from the barber shop case is an excellent
statement of the limitation on the right to cut prices:
"To divert to one's self the customers of a business rival by the offer
of goods at lower prices is in general a legitimate mode of serving one's
own interest, and justifiable as fair competition. But when a man
starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit to
himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of
driving his competitor out of business and with the intention of himself
retiring upon the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he is
guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort. In such a case, he
would not be exercising his legal right, or doing an act which can be
judged separately from the motive which actuated him. To call such
conduct competition is a perversion of terms. It is simply the appli-
cation of force without legal justification, which, in its moral quality,
may be no better than highway robbery." 27
So the principle that a man may use his own property
according to his own needs, while true in the abstract, is
subject to many limitations in the concrete.
26 119 N. W. 946 (Minn. 1909).
27 Op. cit. supra note 26, at p. 948.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Dunshee v. Standard Oil
Co.,28 clearly re-stated the rule of law, when malicious price-
cutting became a legal wrong. The Standard Oil Company,
which was engaged solely in the wholesale business of selling
kerosene, in the course of a conspiracy, secretly entered the
retail business in order to eliminate a retailer who refused
to buy from Standard Oil and who chose to buy from Stand-
ard's competitors. When Standard began a series of vicious
acts to drive the retailer out of business, the court failed
to excuse its conduct. Its most effective weapon against
the retailer was predatory price-cutting. The lawyers for
Standard, defending the conspirators, contended that they
were within their rights to sell below cost, even though ma-
licious motives inspired the act, citing Raycroft v. Tayn-
tor,2 9 Jenkins v. Fowler80 and others of that class of cases.
The court said, examining the cases at hand, and conceding
the point that one may cut prices with malicious motives
and intent, and not violate the law:
"If, however, there was no real purpose or desire to establish a com-
peting business, but, under the guise or pretense of competition, to
accomplish a malicious purpose to ruin the Crystal Company or drive
it out of business, intending themselves to retire therefrom when their
ends had been secured, then they can claim no immunity under the
rules of law which recognize and protect competition between dealers
in the same line of busines seeking in good faith, the patronage of
the same people." 31
Here, said the court in conclusion, was a wanton assault
upon the business of another who had given offense to the
Standard Oil Company. The court further pointed out that
the law does not protect a man against fair competition and
if he cannot meet it, he must make way for those who can.
But competition does not mean "war," in which everything
is fair.
28 132 N. W. 371 (1911).
29 68 Vt. 219, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, 33 L. R. A. 225 (1896).
30 Op. cit. supra note 21.
31 Op. cit. supra note 28, at p. 375.
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In Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.3 2 Judge Hallam
said:
"The language of the Massachusetts court in Martell v. White, 185
Mass. 255, 260, 69 N. E. 1085, 1087, 64 L. R. A. 260, 263, 102 Am.
St. Rep. 341, 346 (1904), is applicable here. Hammond, J., said: 'The
trader is not a free lance. Fight he may, but as a soldier, not as a
guerilla. The right of competition rests upon the doctrine that the
interests of the great public are best subserved by permitting the
general and natural laws of business to have their full and free opera-
tion, and that this end is best attained when the trader is allowed in
his business to make free use of these laws .... But . . .the weapons
used by the trader who relies upon this right for justification must be
those furnished by the laws of trade, or at least must not be incon-
sistent with their free operation . .' " 33
Our Government bureaus, by reason of "skillfully directed
agitation" against the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
have at times in various forms overstepped lawful authority,
in an effort to prevent sales below cost.
In Sears Roebuck v. Federal Trade " the respondent
falsely advertised the sale of sugar below cost, in this
fashion:
"'You save from 2 to 4 cents on every pound.'
"'We can afford to give this guarantee of a "less than wholesale price"
because we are among the largest distributors of sugar wholesale or
retail in the world. We sell every year thirty-five million pounds of
sugar. And, buying in such vast quantities, and buying directly from
the refineries, we naturally get our sugar for less money than other
dealers."' 35
When in truth and fact, it paid as much as its competitors
for the same sugar. That part of the Commission's order
directing the respondent to cease lying about its sugar and
resorting to other devices outside of its right to sell the
sugar below cost, was upheld by the Circuit Court of Ap-
32 142 N. W. 930 (1913).
83 Op. ci. supra note 32, at p. 935.
34 258 Fed. 307 (1919).
35 Op. cit. supra note 34, at pp. 308, 309.
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peals for the Seventh Circuit, but the section of the order
that flatly prohibited sales of sugar below cost was decisively
overruled. You will see from the following quotation that
it is not the sale below cost but the added act of deception
to induce the sale that is declared illegal:
"In the second paragraph of the order petitioner is commanded to
cease selling sugar below cost. We find in the statute no intent on the
part of Congress, even if it has the power, to restrain an owner of
property from selling it any price that is acceptable to kim or from
giving it away. But manifestly in making such a sale or gift the owner
may put forward representations and commit acts which have a capac-
ity or a tendency to injure or to discredit competitors and to deceive
purchasers as to the real character of the transaction. That paragraph
should therefore be modified by adding to it 'by means of or in con-
nection with the representations prohibited in the first paragraph of
this order, or similar representation.' " 3
Trade groups under the guiding hands of alleged experts
on the law of keeping up prices to buyers, have not as yet
found a successful method to circumvent the Constitution
when their schemes are judicially examined.
The widely-advertised Eddy plan, which he claimed would
legally keep up prices and prevent sales below cost, was
declared illegal by the Supreme court in United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co." Mr. Justice McReynolds said
about this gentleman's scheme to punish price-cutters:
"Their [defendants, who were producers of linseed oil, cake, and meal]
manifest purpose was to defeat the Sherman Act without subjecting
themselves to its penalties. The challenged plan is unlawful . .." 38
Mr. Gadd, another gentleman with a scheme to punish
price-cutters, also met with defeat in American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States. " His plan was bragged about
in this fashion:
"All those who have access to your reports bring their prices to the
top. * * *
S6 Op. cit. supra note 34, at p. 312.
37 262 U. S. 371 (1922).
38 Op. cit. supra note 37, at p. 390.
39 257 U. S. 377 (1921).
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"There seems to be a friendly rivalry among members to see who can
get the best prices; whereas, under the old plan, it was cutthroat
competition." 40
The Court, referring to previously defeated plans, said:
"The 'Plan' is, essentially, simply an expansion of the gentleman's
agreement of former days, skilfully devised to evade the law." 41
Even though there was no written agreement to punish
price-cutters who refused to maintain the agreed high prices
to the consuming public, nevertheless, the Court said it was
the sellers' plan against the buyers' rights and would not
be tolerated as a means to break down competition in inter-
state commerce.
A more recent scheme to prevent sales below cost is the
use of agency contracts, so drawn that the line of demar-
cation between a contract of sale and one of agency cannot
be seen without the aid of quite unusual legal vision. Where
the owner of personalty fears that his idea of a re-sale price
will not be maintained by the man to whom he sells, or if
he is one who believes that his magnificent campaign of
advertising will be nullified and the article in question is so
puffed that the retailer either must have it or go out of
business, agency contracts are submitted for wholesale job-
bers and retailers with only the dotted line exposed for sig-
nature. From thence on, the buyers are in bondage under
the agreement. Terms of agency contracts to maintain
prices are generally as drastic and arbitrary as is the public
demand for the goods. The lawyer will note in these con-
tracts that hardly enough of the title seems to remain in
the seller to make it a genuine agency contract instead of
an outright sale. For many years after the Dr. Miles Med.
Co. case 42 the inventions of the legal mind to thwart the
intentions of the Constitution met with little success.
40 Op. cit. supra note 39, at p. 408.
41 Op. cit. supra note 39, at pp. 410, 411.
42 Op. cit. supra note 12.
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Of recent years, however, contracts of agency in one form
or another have become a popular method of preventing
sales below cost and keeping up prices. A noteworthy ex-
ample of the best type of agency contract is found in the
case of United States v. General Electric Co., Westinghouse
Electric & Manufacturing Co., and Westinghouse Lamp
Co.,43 where the Supreme Court went the limit to save a
price-fixing scheme, when it held the facts presented to be
an agency contract and not a sale in disguise. This case
illustrates how far ownership may be extended by alleged
assignments, in order to keep up prices and yet not violate
the law against restraints of trade and the alienation of per-
sonal property. The contract declared, in part, as follows:
'To sell lamps from the stock to any consumer to the extent
of his requirements for immediate delivery at prices speci-
fied by the company;" "the agent is to pay all expenses in
the storage, cartage, transportation, handling, sale and dis-
tribution of lamps . . . and to the collection of accounts
created." "The agent guarantees the return to the company
of all unsold lamps . . ." "The agent is to pay over to the
company not later than the 15th of each month an amount
equal to the total sales value, less the agent's compensation,
of all the company's lamps sold by him. . . . " "The agent
is to pay to the company the value of all the company's
lamps lost or missing from or damaged in the stock in his
custody ... The company ... carries whatever insurance
is carried on the stocks ... in the hands of its agents .
he (the agent) guarantees the account when made ..."
The court recognized that the scheme was "to avoid.., and
prevent sale . . . to consumers at different and competing
prices." 41
Getting the retailer to admit he is not the owner, casting
all the burden of finding the customer and guaranteeing the
43 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
44 Op. cit. supra note 43, at pp. 482, 483, 484.
45 Op. cit. supra note 43, at p. 483.
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collectibility of his customers' accounts, while the defendant
held title by an agency device that practical men should see
through immediately, especially when the purpose is to keep
up prices, raises the proper question,-Why was the Su-
preme Court so gullible in this Lamp Co. case as not to
read between the lines? The defendant here seems to have
taken literally the advice of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John Park & Sons Co.,46 where he said
in his dissenting opinion, examining the agency contract
before him:
"In the first place, by a slight change in the form of the contract the
plaintiff can accomplish the result in a way that would be beyond
successful attack." 47
The Supreme Court is likely to find that it has struck
a false note in sanctioning these agency lamp contracts
because many and sundry will be the devices to fit the deci-
sion into price maintenance ways of selling. In this case,
millions of dollars of electrical lamps on the shelves of
nearly twenty-five thousand little and big dealers located
all over the United States, awaiting sales to customers, that
have been actually paid for by the retailers, or their pay-
ment guaranteed, are held not to be owned by the retailer
so that the company could be licensed to regulate the price
of lamps to prevent sales below cost and price cutting to the
retailers' customers. This is a clear case of having your
pie after eating it.
The owner of extensively advertised movables has been
repeatedly protected in his right as a trader, to refuse to
deal with price-cutters.48 No one should find fault with the
right to refuse to sell as defined by the Supreme Court in
these cases. It is selling it and having authority over it,
that is objectionable.
46 Op. cit. supra note 12.
47 Op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 411.
48 United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1918); United States v. A.
Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85 (1919).
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The desire is to get the goods into the price-cutter's store
because of his large means of distribution, and to compel
him to resell at the price agreeable to the owner of the ad-
vertised merchandise. If the trader acts alone in this prac-
tice and does not use the force of cooperative assistance,
he will find the agents of the government standing by his
side to protect him in the title and distribution of his prop-
erty.4 9
All questions of patents and copyrights being out of the
way, the excellent definition of Justice Hughes, in Dr. Miles
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,5 ° remains the law
of today:
"But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it does
not follow in case of sales actually made he may impose upon pur-
chasers every sort of restriction. Thus, a general restraint upon aliena-
tion is ordinarily invalid. 'The right of alienation is one of the essen-
tial incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints
upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public
policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such
things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in the alienation
of articles, things, chattels, except when a very special kind of property
is involved, such as a slave or an heirloom, have been generally held
void. "If a man," says Lord Coke, in 2 Coke on Littleton, § 360, 'be
possessed . . . of a horse or any other chattel, real or personal, and
give or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that
the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because
his whole interest and property is out of him, so as he hath no possi-
bility of reverter; and it is against trade and traffic and bargaining
and contracting between man and man." '" 5'
Congress enacted Section 2 of the Clayton Act not for
the purpose of preventing sales below cost per se, as was
thought by many, but for the purpose of preventing sales
of property in commerce in those cases where traders did
49 Federal Trade Com. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1921);
Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208 (1920).
50 Op. cit. supra note 12.
5 Op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 405. See also John D. Parks & Sons Co. v.
Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (1907); GRAY, RESTRAiNTS ON ALTENATION OF PROPERTY,
§§ 27, 28.
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more than merely sell below cost or sell at different prices
to different customers.
The additional wrongful act, as found in Tuttle v. Buck 52
and Dunshee v. Standard Oil,5" done in interstate commerce,
was the thing sought to be punished by Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, providing that
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities, which commodities are
sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession
or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, where the
effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price
between purchasers of commodities on account of differences in the
grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only
due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation, or
discrimination of price in the same or different communities made in
good faith to meet competition: And provided further, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares,
or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in
bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." ,4
In S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.55 the
Spark Plug manufacturer sold his plugs for less than cost;
profits were not earned on the original sale, but were earned
upon the increased price obtained on the renewal orders. It
was contended that this practice of selling below cost was
a direct violation of Section 2, because there was discrimina-
tion in price between those who bought under the original
plan of large sales to manufacturers of automobiles, as
against another plan which was to sell for replacement pur-
poses to retail distributors who were not manufacturers.
The Spark Plug Company in its sales was in open competi-
tion with other manufacturers. The court, after holding
52 Op. cit. supra note 26.
53 Op. cit. supra note 28.
54 38 STAT. 730.
55 3 Fed. (2d) 415 (1925).
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that the field was open to fair competition, in spite of the
sales below cost, said of Section 2 of the Clayton Act that
the scheme of the Spark Plug manufacturer was a clever
means of advertising and stated that:
"That act-rightly interpreted-forbids discrimination in price be-
tween purchasers only where the effect may be unreasonably to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly, which we think is not shown
to be the case here. The price of the car to the original purchasers
is presumably lessened by the low prices paid for factory equipment.
The replacement price is not necessarily thereby increased above the
normal from the mere fact that the loss incurred in providing factory
equipment must be overcome by replacement prices. The field is open
to all fair competitors. No doubt the immense quantities of plugs
which plaintiff has been able to supply as factory equipment has en-
abled it to manufacture and market at much less cost than it other-
wise could. The furnishing of factory equipment at less than cost
seems to present a not unfair analogy to cost of advertising." 56
Myron W. Watkins, in the Columbia Law Review,57 after
showing that no less than 521 out of 573 proceedings before
the Commission or a total of 91% were concerned with the
prevention of false and misleading advertising and trade
names, submits that there is a startling shift from the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's function as directed by Congress.
On the other hand, it is noticeable that its price mainte-
nance and prohibition against sales below cost policy of the
Commission, which is so deliberately contrary to its author-
ity under Sections 5 of the Federal Trade Act and 2 of the
Clayton Act, would give rise to the reasons for much of the
agitation against our anti-trust laws. The daily press con-
tinuously records the applause of a certain type of corporate
lawyer in high places who encourages the Commission in its
endeavors against false advertising and urges a complete
abandonment of prosecution against price discrimination
and monopolizing. However, enough has happened in the
courts recently which should direct the Commission's atten-
56 Op. cit. supra note 55, at p. 420.
57 Myron W. Watkins, An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 272.
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tion to what courts understand "Unfair methods in compe-
tition" to mean when price discrimination and sales below
cost are involved in agreements to destroy 'business and
property of competitors. 58
Organized big business by "skillfully directed agitation"
says little business gives its goods away by means of sales
below cost. One of the big fellows who keeps up the prices
to the public becomes the leader of high prices and offers to
agree to let the little fellow see its cost books if all agree
to exchange cost figures so that comparisons may be freely
made, the ostensible purpose being to train the little fellow
to charge more to the public. The most stupid senators in
Washington ought to see the reason for wanting to legalize
exchanging cost data among competitors. Pressure on the
bureaus at Washington, by those believing in keeping up
prices, has met with considerable encouragement. Exchange
of cost price data is said to be the only thing that is needed
to keep up prices to unorganized buyers. To know your
competitor's cost price is to know where to begin to fix
a price that will be all the traffic can stand.
Emanating out of group conferences of basic industries,
organized by the Federal Trade Commission which are pre-
sided over by a Commissioner, are many rules to keep up
prices to the consuming public and to eliminate price com-
petition among the groups. The rules are found in subtle
disguises. Two of the favorite ones now alleged to be sanc-
tioned by the Federal Trade Act are found in Group 2, Rule
A, Subdivision B, Steel furniture, and Rule K, formerly 17,
Petroleum industry, which are, respectively:
"The industry approves the practice of making the terms of sale a
part of all published price schedules."
58 VanCamp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1928);
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 Fed. (2d) 763 (1930); Porto
Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 Fed. (2d) 234 (1929);
Stary Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1930).
COMPETITION AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 463
"No seller shall make any deviation from his posted prices (whether
wholesale or retail) by means of secret rebates, allowances, bonuses,
concessions, benefits, unusual credits, scrip books, or any plan, device
or other scheme which may directly or indirectly permit the buyer to
obtain gasoline or kerosene at a lower net cost to him."
In this last rule, it is safe to say that it never has been
illegal except in times of war for an owner of personal prop-
erty to obtain as much for his goods as he can get and to
keep from his competitor any of his methods of doing busi-
ness, whether they be by one or all of the methods above
outlined. The most attractive thing in the excitement of
doing business and trading is that of arriving at a com-
mon understanding by processes agreeable only to both
parties to the transaction."
Professor Frank Albert Fetter's recent book, "The Mas-
querade of Monopoly," reveals, from the standpoint of a
practical long experienced economist, many of the subtle
disguises and schemes to thwart the laws of fair trade, that
our government has failed to discover.
At page 428 he says of our present day competitive sys-
tem:
"A great burden of proof is on those who would substitute for the
competition of efficient independent operating units of industry in our
capitalistic system, networks of artificial price agreements, and the
ideal and practice of the vast financial consolidations, mergers of
mergers far beyond the point justified by technical efficiency. Almost,
by conspiracy of reiteration from powerful influences, this burden of
proof has been artfully shifted. Unified control of prices under the
attractive alias of 'cooperation' is to take the place of orderly, regulated
competition as the rule of the market. A chorus of self-interested
propagandists has tried and almost succeeded for a time in making us
believe that in this 'new era' monopoly and not competition is the life
of trade. In economics that is a midsummer night's madness."
Nowhere in the Federal Trade Act do we find the Com-
mission receiving the power to organize trades or to adopt
a code for a whole industry that will control prices either
59 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, op. cit. supra note 39.
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directly or indirectly, but so popular among trade organiza-
tions has its Trade Conference Division become since its
reorganization on June 5, 1926, that more than 150 trades
have been organized and codes of practice for each trade's
business adopted.
Selling below cost has been declared to be an unfair
method in competition and is now officially frowned upon.
A quite popular rule of practice among trade organizations,
desiring to keep up prices, bearing different numbers in the
Commission's listings, is:
"The selling of goods below own cost for the purpose of injuring a
competitor and/or with the effect of lessening competition is an unfair
trade practice."
To the independent trader this rule can only have one
effect and object; i. e., to prevent sales below cost and to
make him keep up his price. The sale of a bill of goods
below cost where there is competition, injures and lessens
competition, but does so lawfully as found in the above cited
cases.
The rule, as agreed to by the Commission's organized
combines, is not only inherently bad law, "but strikes down
those essential rights of private property protected by the
Constitution against undue governmental interference." 00
It is a direct violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and against the interest of the purchasing pub-
lic of the country, who support the Commission by taxa-
tion. On examination of Commonwealth v. O'Brien,6 and
illustrating it further with the following example, it will
appear that the Government prohibition is at least a doubt-
ful practice in restraint of trade. Jones and Smith each have
a horse to sell. McCarthy wants to buy a horse. Jones
determined to make the sale, sells it to McCarthy below
60 Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 12 Cush. 84-90 (1853).
61 Op. cit. supra note 60.
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cost. Smith was injured by the loss of profit on the sale of
the horse and competition between him and Jones was not
only lessened but lawfully destroyed. Nothing done by
Jones was unfair and could not be made so without an
amendment to the Constitution. "Skillfully directed agita-
tion" has brought about such loose statements of the law
as to master the minds of some whose duty it is to protect
the public.
Congress has left "Unfair Methods of Competition" to
be undefined so that each state of facts as between con-
tending traders can be settled only upon the issuance of
a complaint by the Commission, findings of fact and judi-
cial supervision of the matter before the process of Govern-
ment against the right to do business is put in motion.
If it is not against the law or good morals to sell below
cost, and it is against the law to exchange cost information,
both of which cannot help but result in keeping up prices,
the Commission cannot declare such acts of independent
trades contrary to law, in spite of what bad names the
groups call them or wish the law to be.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-Clark
Company " the court said:
"The words 'unfair method of competition,' as used in the act, 'are
clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed
to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud,
or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous
tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.' Federal
Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 . . . Federal Trade
Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 453 .... If real
competition is to continue the right of the individual to exercise reason-
able discretion in respect of his own business methods must be pre-
served. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz. .... "
The Commission is not even a subordinate judicial tri-
bunal or legislative court endowed with the power of ren-
62 263 U. S. 565, 572 (1923).
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dering advisory opinions or declaratory judgments in ad-
vance of issuing its complaints.6"
Impatient with its lack of power to heed the voice of
organized business, many doubtful legal rights have been
given to business and put into the Trade Practice Confer-
ences which will ultimately cause it considerable grief. Al-
ready reactions are developing in the oil, sugar, and copper
industries.
There is a wide distinction between the power of a bureau
and the power of a court to regulate the sale of personal
property."
No legal proposition is on clearer or more definite ground
than that which defines the free right to pass title to personal
property. It is treason to the Constitution for Congress or
States to in any manner circumvent a trader's free exercise
of the right to fix a price for his wares agreeable to himself,
or to prevent buying in open competitive markets. If legis-
latures or commissions may foster schemes that result in
keeping up prices by artificial regulations of the law of sup-
ply, for industries that can make the loudest protest against
consumer's rights, even though these schemes are masquer-
aded so that the honest official cannot see through the pur-
pose, it logically follows that the protection of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments is purely a matter of favor de-
pending only upon the whim of official fiat.
State or Congressional statutes or governmental agencies
directly or indirectly suspending the natural right to do
business, which is preserved in all its ancient plenitude by
the Constitution, cannot be justified on any reasonable
ground.
63 Op. cit. supra note 57.
64 Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the
Legal Process (1932) 45 HA. L. Rxv. 617.
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In Spinoza's "Tractus Politicus," after a long discussion
of the "Rights of States," "Rights of Individualism and
Liberty," he sums up thusly:
"The last end of a state is not to dominate men nor to restrain them
by fear. Rather it is to free each man from fear that he may live
and act with full security and without injury to himself or his neighbor.
The end of the state, I repeat, is not to make rational being into brute
beasts and machines-it is to enable their bodies and their minds to
function safely. It is to lead men to live by and to exercise a free
reason, that they may not waste their strength in hatred) anger and
guile, nor act unfairly toward one another. Thus the end of the state
is really liberty."
Henry Ward Beer.
Brooklyn Law School.
